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Review Essays 
INTERPRETATION AND PHILOSOPHY: 
DWORKIN'S CONSTITUTION* 
Edward B. Foley** 
"Holmes wrote like a dream," Ronald Dworkin observes in 
Freedom's Law, his new collection of essays on constitutional in-
terpretation. (p. 360, n.16) The same thing, of course, can be 
said of Dworkin himself. He is a master wordsmith, and these 
essays are a great pleasure to read even when they become a bit 
repetitive. Most of the essays were originally published in the 
New York Review of Books for a general audience without spe-
cialized legal training. Accordingly, Dworkin takes care in each 
essay to explain the basic issues that confront constitutional theo-
rists. Since he has left these essays largely unchanged from their 
original form, we read the same explanation of the basic issues 
numerous times before completing the book. No matter. Dwor-
kin is such a good writer that his work can withstand repetition. 
Indeed, it is worth reading some of Dworkin's passages out loud. 
His prose often sounds like poetry, having the natural rhythm of 
iambic verse. 
Dworkin, however, is no mere stylist. His words convey 
ideas of great importance and intelligence. Many of his insights 
are truly brilliant and original, and, having the benefit of them, 
one's own thinking about constitutional law is forever changed 
for the better. For example, Dworkin's defense of Roe as a right 
rooted in the religion clauses, although problematic for reasons 
we shall discuss, entirely transforms the debate about Roe.l No 
longer is the question simply whether Roe, as an instance of 
"substantive due process," represents all the errors of that con-
* Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American 
Constitution (Harvard U. Press, 1996). 
•• Associate Professor, The Ohio State University College of Law. Thanks to 
Frank Beytagh, Jim Brudney, Phil Frickey, Michael McConnell, Peter Swire, and Mark 
Tushnet, all of whom made valuable comments on an earlier draft of this essay. 
1. This debate continues, at least as a theoretical matter, despite the Court's deci-
sion in Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
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tradictory concept. Instead, the issue now is whether Roe really 
is any different than any other major First Amendment case, like 
the ones involving saluting or burning the flag. 
Most important of all, Dworkin's central thesis about consti-
tutional interpretation, or something like it, must be right. 
Dworkin's basic claim, which he restates in various ways 
throughout these essays, is that constitutional interpretation is 
not possible without the aid of political philosophy-without, in 
other words, thoughtful consideration about what constitutional 
rights citizens of a democratic republic ought to have. Dworkin 
contrasts his claim with the belief that a court can interpret the 
Constitution without having to engage at all in normative inquiry 
about what rights people should have, as if the Constitution's au-
thors had already done all the thinking on this subject and the 
only job of judges is to enforce this received wisdom in the law-
suits that come before them. 
This belief that normative inquiry is entirely exogenous to 
the judicial exercise of constitutional interpretation, although 
perhaps prevalent among members of the general public, is obvi-
ously naive and dismissed as such by almost all members of the 
legal profession. As Dworkin himself points out, (p. 76) even 
those, like Bork, who have attempted to articulate a theory of 
constitutional interpretation that immunizes judges from consid-
erations of political philosophy have ended by acknowledging 
that judges inevitably must make value judgments when they in-
terpret the Constitution. Thus, Dworkin stands essentially un-
challenged with respect to his central claim. 
Even so, Dworkin's defense of this claim is not entirely per-
suasive. For reasons I shall discuss, Dworkin himself relies too 
much on the text of the Constitution to justify his method for 
interpreting the text. As an alternative to Dworkin's approach, I 
shall suggest an account of constitutional interpretation in which 
the actual language of the Constitution serves as little more than 
a potential obstacle to judicial decisions reached independently 
by considerations of pure political philosophy. (By "pure polit-
ical philosophy," I mean the judge's own normative beliefs about 
what the Constitution ideally ought to say.) I show why this al-
ternative account better explains and justifies not only Roe, to 
which Dworkin devotes much of his attention, but also such im-
portant decisions as Reynolds v. Simsz (one-person-one-vote) 
and Blaisde[[3 (the mortgage moratorium case), which Dworkin 
2. 377 u.s. 533 (1964}. 
3. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
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unfortunately ignores. In addition, as a further illustration of the 
advantages of this alternative account, I shall discuss the issue of 
poverty as a problem of constitutional law, a topic about which 
Dworkin is unduly dismissive. 
I. DWORKIN THE TEXTUALIST 
Dworkin defends his claim that constitutional interpretation 
requires reliance on political philosophy by invoking the text of 
the Constitution itself. He points to the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses, among others, and says that these clauses are 
written in very abstract language and refer to fundamental philo-
sophical values. A court seeking to understand the meaning and 
implications of these clauses has no choice but to engage in phil-
osophical inquiry concerning the content of these fundamental 
values. For example, what specifically must a state do, or not do, 
in order to give everyone within its jurisdiction "equal protection 
of the laws"? To answer this question, as Dworkin says, neces-
sarily requires a court to consider philosophically the value of 
legal equality. (p. 9) 
Dworkin contrasts the abstract provisions of the Constitu-
tion with other, much more concrete clauses. As an example, he 
points to the Third Amendment, which prohibits the government 
from quartering troops in a person's house during peacetime 
without consent. This provision, Dworkin observes, does not re-
fer to an abstract and broad fundamental value like privacy or 
liberty. Instead, it concerns only the very specific and narrow 
problem of housing soldiers in civilian homes. Accordingly, 
Dworkin maintains, it would be inappropriate for a court to in-
terpret this specific and narrow provision as protecting some fun-
damental philosophical value. (p. 8) 
Thus, apparently for Dworkin, it is the language of the Con-
stitution itself that ultimately justifies judicial reliance on norma-
tive inquiry. The implication of Dworkin's argument is that if the 
Constitution were written differently, then there would be no 
need for judicial philosophizing. In other words, if the Constitu-
tion contained only narrow and specific provisions like the Third 
Amendment, and none of the broad and abstract provisions like 
the Equal Protection Clause, then there would be no basis for 
courts to consider fundamental moral values in the course of con-
stitutional interpretation. 
But this text-bound argument is not right. The presence in 
the Constitution of the Free Speech and Equal Protection 
Clauses makes no difference to the judicial protection of free 
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speech or legal equality. Even if the First Amendment had never 
been adopted, the courts still would have had to develop the doc-
trines of free expression.4 Freedom of expression is absolutely 
essential to existence of a democratic government, and therefore 
a right of free expression is implicit in the Constitution whether 
or not the Constitution contains the First Arnendment.s The text 
of the First Amendment merely confirms what would be true 
even in the absence of the text-just like, as Marshall said in Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland,6 the Necessary and Proper Clause merely 
confirms what is already implicit in the design of the federal 
system. 
The same point is equally true of the Equal Protection 
Clause. The fundamental idea of legal equality is also an essen-
tial element to a democratic regime. Thus, the requirement of 
legal equality is implicit in the Constitution even if there is no 
Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, in Bolling v. Sharpe7 and sub-
sequent cases, the Court has had to recognize this point, since by 
its terms the Equal Protection Clause does not apply to the ac-
tions of the federal government. 
In sum, judges engage in philosophical inquiry concerning 
the requirements of free speech and legal equality not because 
the Constitution happens to have clauses that refer to these fun-
damental values, but rather just because the values are so funda-
mental. It seems like subterfuge on Dworkin's part for him to 
say that judicial reliance on philosophy results from the text 
when, in fact, the existence of the text is irrelevant, and the true 
ground of judicial decision is the necessity of protecting funda-
mental values, whatever the text might say. It would be more 
forthright for Dworkin to follow the lead of Marshall in McCul-
loch and acknowledge when the text merely confirms what is 
necessary anyway because of independent reasons of political 
philosophy.s 
4. Indeed, even Bork has expressed this view: "Freedom for political speech could 
and should be inferred even if there were no first amendment." Robert H. Bork, Neutral 
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 23 (1971). 
5. For precisely this reason, the High Court of Australia has ruled that Australia's 
Constitution implicitly protects free speech even though it contains no written Bill of 
Rights. See William Rich, Constitutional Law in the United States and Australia, 35 Wash-
bum L.J. 1, 22-28 (1995). 
6. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
7. 347 u.s. 497 (1954). 
8. There is still the question whether the textual provisions concerning "freedom of 
speech" or "equal protection" should entail more than what the philosophically essential 
principles of free speech and legal equality would absolutely require in the absence of the 
text. My answer is no, because in a democracy the legislature should prevail, unless the 
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Dworkin makes his textualist argument because he wants 
the mandate for judicial philosophizing to come from the Consti-
tution itself rather than from the judge. "Judges," Dworkin says, 
"may not read their own convictions into the Constitution." (p. 
10) He fears the charge that judges contravene the limits of their 
office if they impose their own moral convictions on law rather 
than enforce the moral values embodied in the law itself. Dwor-
kin, of course, is no simple positivist. As we have already dis-
cussed, Dworkin's central mission is to discredit the simple 
positivistic belief that judges can enforce the morality of the law 
without making some moral choices of their own. But Dworkin 
shares with the positivists the aspiration that the judge's deci-
sions be somehow rooted in the law itself and emanate from the 
authority of the law itself. Dworkin, as much as any positivist, 
thinks it wrong for a judge to let the law guide his decisionmak-
ing only to the extent that it conforms to his antecedent moral 
convictions. This judicial approach would make the law entirely 
subservient to the judge's personal morality, thus negating any 
separation between law and morality, a separation which Dwor-
kin is eager to preserve. Even if legal interpretation occasionally 
requires reliance on a judge's moral judgments, Dworkin wants 
legal interpretation to be a distinct enterprise from pure political 
philosophy. It is as important for Dworkin as for the positivists 
that the right answer to an issue of constitutional interpretation 
not inevitably be the right answer from the perspective of pure 
political philosophy. 
But this distinction is not so easy to maintain. Suppose, 
again, that the Constitution contained no First or Fourteenth 
Amendment, indeed no Bill of Rights at all. Suppose, instead, 
the Constitution contained the minimum number of provisions 
necessary to establish the three branches of government and pro-
cedures for amendment and ratification. Even in this situation, 
as I have suggested, the judiciary would be justified in declaring 
the existence of constitutional rights to free expression and legal 
equality (if and when the legislature enacted laws that contra-
vened these fundamental values). In one sense, these judicial 
declarations would be pure philosophizing because nothing in the 
minimalist text of this hypothetical Constitution even hints at the 
existence of these rights. Yet, in another sense, these judicial 
declarations can be considered acts of interpretation. A court 
could say, for example, that the most basic purpose of any consti-
essential requirements of justice dictate otherwise-or unless there is no other conceiva· 
ble way to construe the words of the text. 
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tution, including this minimalist one, is to establish a system of 
government that is fundamentally fair to everyone within its ju-
risdiction. No government is fundamentally fair unless it guaran-
tees freedom of expression and legal equality. Thus, interpreting 
the Constitution in accordance with its most basic purpose, we 
must presume that the Constitution implicitly protects these fun-
damental rights. 
This example shows that the distinction between interpreta-
tion and pure philosophizing is, at best, a fuzzy one. In the case 
of the minimalist Constitution, the exercise of interpretation is 
essentially equivalent to pure philosophizing. The minimalist 
Constitution must be construed to guarantee certain rights no-
where referenced in the text just because pure political philoso-
phy tells us that any fundamentally fair constitution would 
protect these rights. 
In any event, this kind of constitutional interpretation is very 
different from the account of constitutional interpretation that 
Dworkin gives us in Freedom's Law. Dworkin would have us 
believe that judges engage in philosophical inquiry solely because 
the text of the Constitution compels them to do so. "We are gov-
erned by what our lawmakers said-by the principles they laid 
down," writes Dworkin. (p. 10) But in the case of the minimalist 
constitution, the mandate for judicial philosophizing certainly 
does not come from the constitution itself. Instead, it comes 
solely from the judge's view that the constitution as written 
should conform to the requirements of a fundamentally fair con-
stitution, as dictated by political philosophy. 
Let me be perfectly clear. I think it is entirely legitimate for 
a judge to take this view. But a judge who takes this view is not 
acting in accordance with the account of constitutional interpre-
tation that Dworkin describes.9 
9. Dworkin also oversimplifies the distinction between interpretation and philoso-
phy in his discussion of natural law. (p. 316) Dworkin says there are two different ways a 
judge might rely on natural law. One way would be to say that the Constitution as written 
and ratified is contrary to natural law and thus itself invalid. As Dworkin observes, this 
argument was sometimes made by abolitionists prior to the Civil War, when the Constitu-
tion contained the Fugitive Slave Clause, which guaranteed the return of fugitive slaves to 
their slaveowners. The other possible use of natural law, according to Dworkin, is to in-
voke natural law concepts to elucidate the meaning of the Constitution's abstract clauses. 
If natural law would condemn certain forms of punishment as inhumanly cruel, then a 
judge could rely upon this determination of natural law in interpreting the Eighth 
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. 
But Dworkin's distinction between these two ways of using natural law misses the 
possibility of a third, intermediary use. Drawing again upon our example of the ~nimal­
ist constitution, we can see that a court could rely upon natural law to detemune what 
constitutional rights it should protect, even though the minimalist constitution contains no 
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Dworkin might respond that he need not consider the case 
of the minimalist constitution because that constitution is not the 
one we have today. Our Constitution does contain abstract pro-
visions that refer explicitly to basic civil rights like "freedom of 
speech" and "equal protection of the laws." Thus, at least for our 
existing Constitution, the mandate for philosophizing does come 
directly from the text itself, and hence we need not worry about a 
counterfactual hypothetical. 
But this response is unsatisfactory for several reasons. First 
of all, basic principles of constitutional interpretation should be 
valid regardless of how the Constitution is actually worded. Af-
ter all, fundamental interpretative principles are the tools that a 
judge brings to the text. They tell a judge how to read the actual 
words of the text. Thus, they cannot come from the words 
themselves.Io 
Second, and a related point, Dworkin's approach does not 
tell us how to handle possible amendments to the text. It is 
hardly inconceivable that a future constitutional amendment 
might modify one of Dworkin's favored abstract rights. For ex-
ample, cultural conservatives keep pressing for amendments that 
would (1) leave flagburning unprotected by the Free Speech 
Clause and (2) remove any Establishment Clause bar to institu-
tional prayer in public schools. If the cultural conservatives get 
their way, the effect of their amendments may well depend on 
how the Supreme Court understands the status of the constitu-
tional rights protected by the Free Speech and Establishment 
Clauses. If the Court considers those rights part of the Constitu-
tion solely because the First Amendment refers to them, then the 
effect of the new amendments will be to negate those rights pro 
tanto. But if the Court recognizes that the First Amendment 
merely confirms that freedom of expression and religious equal-
ity are essential to the Constitution's very legitimacy, then the 
rights-protecting clauses at all. This use of natural law would fall into neither category 
identified by Dworkin. It is not the same as condemning the minimalist constitution as 
invalid. Nor is it the same as using natural law to elucidate the meaning of a textually 
identified, albeit abstract, right (like the right not to be punished cruelly). Thus, here 
again, Dworkin fails to recognize the possibility of interpretation that is purely philosoph-
ical, with no textual limits at all. 
10. To be sure, the Constitution itself might contain rules instructing judges how to 
interpret the document. But even these rules of interpretation must be read and con-
strued by judges based on their independent views of how such interpretive rules should 
be construed. For example, were the Constitution to contain a clause instructing judges 
to construe the Bill of Rights strictly, so as to minimize interference with Congress and 
state legislatures, the Supreme Court still would have to decide, in a particular case, 
whether to ignore this instruction on the ground that to do so would undermine the legiti-
macy of the Constitution itself (a consequence to be avoided if at all possible). 
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new amendments may not suffice to negate these rights. For ex-
ample, if a new amendment says only that "The First Amend-
ment shall not be construed to prohibit officially sponsored 
prayer in public school," the Court could say that, while this 
amendment negates the First Amendment's prohibition on insti-
tutional prayer in public schools, it does not negate the prohibi-
tion on state-sponsored prayer that is necessarily implicit in any 
legitimate Constitution.11 Of course, the cultural conservatives 
might eventually get their way by adopting another amendment 
that says, "The judiciary lacks any authority to declare an implied 
prohibition on officially sponsored prayer in public schools." But 
they might not succeed the second time around. And so it mat-
ters how we understand the status of the fundamental rights we 
now associate with the First Amendment. 
Third, and most important, for reasons I shall next explain, 
the text of our actual Constitution cannot do all the work that 
Dworkin would have it do. The abstract provisions that Dworkin 
invokes do not necessarily refer to the fundamental philosophical 
principles that Dworkin wants the Constitution to protect. Thus, 
at the end of the day, it is still pure philosophy, and not the text 
itself, that tells judges what fundamental values they should pro-
tect in the name of the existing Constitution.12 
II. DWORKIN'S FAVORITE CLAUSES 
Dworkin focuses most of his attention, not surprisingly, on 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. These amendments con-
tain the clauses that, according to Dworkin, refer to the great 
abstract moral rights that judges must consider philosophically. 
11. Elsewhere I have suggested why it is essential to the fundamental fairness of a 
political regime that the government refrain from taking sides in theological disputes 
about which people reasonably can disagree. See Edward B. Foley, Political Liberalism 
and Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 43 Case W. Res. L. Rev. %3 (1993). 
12. In earlier work, Dworkin placed less reliance on the Constitution's text than he 
does in Freedom's Law. For example, a decade ago in A Matter of Principle (Harvard U. 
Press, 1985), Dworkin belittled the "textualist" view that the text of the Constitution is 
binding upon judges just because it was ratified in accordance with procedures that were 
generally accepted as valid at the time of ratification. Id. at 36-37. Instead, Dworkin 
argued there that the Constitution's text was binding only because two centuries of legal 
practice have imbedded it as such. Even this view arguably accords the text more author-
ity than it deserves, since some centuries-old practices might be so unfair as to undermine 
the legitimacy of the entire legal system, in which case they should be repudiated despite 
their longevity and textual pedigree. In any event, the important issue is not whether the 
text is binding, but whether judges properly may supplement the text by declaring the 
existence of constitutional rights not derivable from the text itself. In both Freedom's 
Law (p. 4) and A Matter of Principle, (p. 35) Dworkin categorically rejects this idea. In 
this respect, then, Dworkin has been consistently more text-bound than he should be. 
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But it is not so clear that these clauses have the meaning that 
Dworkin attributes to them. 
I shall first discuss the Equal Protection and Free Speech 
Clauses because they raise similar problems. Then I shall discuss 
the Due Process Clause, which has special problems of its own. 
Finally, I shall consider Dworkin's effort to use the Religion 
Clauses as an alternative basis for the right to reproductive 
freedom. 
Equal Protection and Free Speech. Dworkin recognizes that 
"equal protection of the laws" and "freedom of speech" might 
well be terms of art that had very narrow meanings to those who 
drafted and ratified these clauses.B "Equal protection of the 
laws" might mean only that all laws, as written, shall be applied 
equally to all who fall within their terms. (p. 9) And "freedom 
of speech" might mean, as Blackstone and others said, only no 
imposition of prior restraints. (p. 199) But, Dworkin says, these 
plausible meanings have been decisively rejected by "unchal-
lengeable precedent." (p. 10) 
Having rejected these narrow interpretations on grounds of 
precedent, Dworkin goes on to argue that the texts of the Equal 
Protection and Free Speech Clauses do not permit distinction be-
tween kinds of discrimination or categories of speech. For exam-
ple, Dworkin discusses the debate about whether the Equal 
Protection Clause should protect against other kinds of discrimi-
nation besides racial discrimination-e.g., discrimination based 
on sex or sexual orientation. Dworkin argues that the text of the 
Equal Protection Clause is not limited to race, and thus the 
Clause should be interpreted to protect against any discrimina-
tion that denies the equal dignity of individuals. (pp. 10, 270) 
The same kind of argument, Dworkin says, applies to the Free 
Speech Clause. (p. 381 n.7) In criticizing the view that the Free 
Speech Clause should be limited to only political speech and 
13. Dworkin makes clear that the question whether the framers used terms of art is 
very different from trying to ascertain the framers' "original intent," as that concept is 
ordinarily used. It is necessary to discover whether the framers used any terms of art 
because it is necessary to know the framers' linguistic intent. To use Dworkin's own ex-
ample, if in the 18th century the word "cruel" meant "expensive," then the Eighth 
Amendment would have a very different meaning. (p. 291) In this case, the Eighth 
Amendment would forbid only "expensive" punishments because courts are bound by the 
framers' linguistic intent. Most advocates of "original intent" interpretation, however, do 
not limit themselves to the Framers' linguistic intent. Instead, they argue that judges are 
bound by the framers' own understanding of the legal effect of the language they used. In 
other words, if the Eighth Amendment barred expensive punishments and the Framers 
thought solitary confinement expensive, then their specific understanding of how the 
Eighth Amendment would apply to solitary confinement would be binding on judges. 
This version of "original intent" theory is what Dworkin emphatically rejects. 
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should not extend to pornography, Dworkin claims that the ab-
stract words of the Clause do not support this narrow limitation. 
But Dworkin's arguments, although eloquent, are unpersua-
sive. Let us assume, as Dworkin suggests, that "equal protec-
tion" and "freedom of speech" were added to the Constitution as 
terms of art, with precise and narrow meanings. In this case, 
then, according to Dworkin's textualist approach, it was a mis-
take for courts in the past to extend the Equal Protection Clause 
beyond a requirement of equal enforcement of the laws as writ-
ten, and the Free Speech Clause beyond a prohibition against 
prior restraints. Even accepting these mistakes as binding prece-
dents, it hardly follows that courts in subsequent cases should ex-
pand the scope of their previous errors. For example, when first 
confronting the issue of sex discrimination, the Supreme Court 
reasonably could have said: 
Although the most plausible interpretation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause is that it prohibits only discriminatory enforce-
ment of the laws as written, longstanding precedent establishes 
that the Clause also prohibits states from enacting laws that by 
their terms discriminate on the basis of race. But this prece-
dent need not be extended to encompass other forms of dis-
crimination. On the contrary, there are good reasons 
emanating from the Nation's history, including the specific his-
torical circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment, to limit the Equal Protection Clause to 
racial discrimination. 
Likewise, in the first pornography case, the Court could have 
written: 
We recognize that we have no warrant for interpreting the 
Free Speech Clause as anything more than a prohibition on 
prior restraints. On the other hand, a solid line of precedent 
has interpreted the Clause to prohibit even subsequent pun-
ishment for the expression of political beliefs. We will not dis-
turb this precedent, but neither will we extend it to prohibit 
punishment for pornography that has no relation to the discus-
sion of political ideas. 
Such efforts to limit the force of mistaken precedent are not 
at all unprincipled. On the contrary, they rest on the plausible 
principle that the Court should do its best to curtail the scope of 
any previous misinterpretations of the text. Not only is it more 
difficult for Congress to correct misinterpretations of the Consti-
tution than to fix errors of statutory interpretation, but judicial 
mistakes that expand the scope of constitutional rights displace 
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the authority of legislatures to enact ordinary legislation to that 
extent. If the Court will not correct the mistake, because the 
weight of precedent is just too great, then the Court will be 
forced to develop a new constitutional principle that differs from 
the one that was adopted in the text. In this situation, the Court 
arguably should adopt a new constitutional principle that does 
the least harm to the existing law, which is the narrowest possible 
principle that covers the mistaken precedent. 
I found in Freedom's Law no theory of precedent to contra-
dict this one. Drawing upon his earlier book Law's Empire,14 
Dworkin says that judges must weave together text and prece-
dent into a coherent whole. But it is not clear how judges could 
do this, at least in this circumstance, without relying upon some-
thing like pure political philosophy. By hypothesis, we are deal-
ing here with a situation in which the judge sincerely believes the 
text and precedent contradict one another. The judge is con-
vinced that "the freedom of speech" in eighteenth century usage 
meant only no prior restraints, yet knows that precedent has pro-
tected political speech from subsequent punishment. In this situ-
ation, even a herculean effort by the judge cannot make the text 
and precedent add up to a general rule that the expression of all 
kinds of speech, sexual as well as political, ought to be protected 
from subsequent punishment. Only if philosophy dictates that 
this general rule ought to be a component of constitutional law 
would it make sense to superimpose this rule upon the contradic-
tory text and precedent. But if this approach is what Dworkin 
advocates, as it appears he does, then he might as well acknowl-
edge that text and precedent are not determinative. If philoso-
phy truly dictates that this general rule should be part of 
constitutional law, and if a judge truly should be motivated by 
this mandate of political philosophy, then the judge will reach the 
same result even in the absence of text and precedent. Thus, 
Dworkin's reliance on precedent to support his interpretations of 
the Free Speech and Equal Protection Clauses is unconvincing. 
Due Process. Dworkin also invokes precedent to support his 
interpretation of the Due Process Clause, but here reliance on 
precedent is even less persuasive. Dworkin, like all students of 
constitutional law, knows that "substantive due process" is a con-
tradiction in terms and that the Due Process Clause should have 
been interpreted initially to guarantee only procedural protec-
tions. But, again, he says that the force of precedent is too great 
to overcome, and thus the Due Process Clause must now be un-
14. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Harvard U. Press, 1986). 
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derstood to contain a general substantive guarantee of liberty. 
(p. 73) 
But this argument is especially weak. The weight of prece-
dent here is not nearly so great as it is in the context of the Free 
Speech and Equal Protection Clauses. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court once disavowed the idea of substantive due process, when 
it repudiated Lochner in Ferguson v. Skrupka,1s only to resurrect 
the idea in Griswold and then again Roe. It would not have 
wreaked havoc in the law for the Court to have confessed error a 
second time and said that the doctrine of substantive due process 
is so self-contradictory that it must be abandoned, never to re-
turn again. 
Of course, repudiation of substantive due process does not 
end the inquiry concerning the validity of Griswold or Roe. The 
Ninth Amendment, together with Fourteenth Amendment's 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, might provide an alternative 
basis for justifying these decisions. But Dworkin does not wish 
to consider the Ninth Amendment argument because to do so 
would be to concede that the right to reproductive autonomy is 
an "unenumerated" constitutional right. 
Dworkin wants to collapse the well-recognized distinction 
between enumerated and unenumerated rights. (p. 76) His mo-
tivation is obvious. The philosophical value underlying an 
unenumerated right, by definition, has no textual basis and must 
be identified solely by the court from its own purely philosophi-
cal speculations. Thus, the judicial philosophizing that leads to 
the recognition of an unenumerated right lacks the constraints of 
judicial philosophizing called for by the interpretation of enu-
merated rights. 
But Dworkin's effort to collapse the distinction between 
enumerated and unenumerated rights works only if the Due Pro-
cess Clause can legitimately be considered to protect a general 
substantive right to liberty. Then, as Dworkin correctly says, the 
right to reproductive freedom is merely an aspect of the enumer-
ated general right of "substantive due process," just as the right 
to burn a flag is an aspect of the more general right to free ex-
pression. (p. 80) If, however, substantive due process is a thor-
oughly discreditable idea, as many believe, then the distinction 
between enumerated and unenumerated rights reemerges in full 
force. 
15. 372 u.s. 726 (1963). 
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Religion Clauses. Given all these difficulties, it is no wonder 
that Dworkin endeavors to develop the Religion Clauses as an 
alternative basis for reproductive freedom. The argument is 
profound and subtle, and I can only summarize it here. Essen-
tially, the claim is that contraception and abortion are issues of 
conscience about which humans can reasonably differ depending 
upon their views on religious questions such as what is life's ulti-
mate purpose. The freedom to follow one's own conscience on 
such matters is a right that, according to Dworkin, should be con-
sidered part of the free exercise of religion. Similarly, if the gov-
ernment orders everyone to conform to one side's view of these 
religious issues, then the government has taken a position on a 
religious controversy in violation of the Establishment Clause. 
To sustain this claim, Dworkin recognizes that he must dis-
tinguish contraception and abortion from other issues of con-
science. As he himself says, some religions have advocated 
infanticide or ritual sacrifice, but there is obviously no Free Exer-
cise right to act in accordance with these religious beliefs. (p. 
107) Dworkin distinguishes abortion from infanticide by saying 
that the aborted fetus, unlike an infant, is not a person for pur-
poses of constitutional law. But, as far as I could tell, Dworkin 
offers no argument to explain why fetuses are not "constitutional 
persons" other to say that "[n]o justice or prominent politician 
has even advanced that claim." (p. 87) 
In any event, even if fetuses do not count as persons, it does 
not follow that women have a right to an abortion as an exercise 
of their religious beliefs about life's purpose. As Dworkin him-
self observes, animals are obviously not persons and yet the gov-
ernment can prevent citizens from engaging in ritual animal 
sacrifice, (p. 90)-as long as it does so pursuant to a law that does 
not aim specifically at curtailing religiously motivated animal 
slaughter.16 Dworkin distinguishes abortion from animal sacri-
fice by saying that the harm to a women from being denied the 
right to an abortion is much greater than the harm to someone 
denied the right to engage in animal sacrifice.l7 But it is difficult 
to understand how Dworkin can say this. The religious believer 
16. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993), 
holds that the government cannot punish ritual animal slaughter, even pursuant to a law 
that is religiously neutral on its face, if the underlying motive in adopting the law is to ban 
a specific religious practice. That decision, however, would not bar any animal protection 
law that lacked such a specifically prejudicial animus. 
17. Dworkin writes: 
States can protect the interests of nonpersons. But it is extremely doubtful 
whether a state can appeal to such interests to justify a significant abridgement 
of an important constitutional right, such as a pregnant woman's right to control 
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may perceive the animal sacrifice as essential to avoid a plague 
on his family or perhaps even eternal damnation. If a community 
can outlaw cruelty to animals, notwithstanding sincere religious 
objections to the law, it is hard to see why the community must 
yield to a religious reason for seeking an abortion. 
Instead of trying to root the right to an abortion in the Reli-
gion Clauses, Dworkin might do better to say that the Constitu-
tion must protect this right for the basic reason that women 
would be morally justified in disobeying any law that attempted 
to prohibit an abortion prior to viability. What woman would 
reasonably consent to a regime that did not give her the right to 
decide for herself whether she should carry a pre-viable fetus to 
term?ts Because the Constitution should be interpreted, if at all 
possible, to conform to the provisions of a fair social contract 
that all reasonable people would agree upon, the Constitution 
should be interpreted to protect the right to an abortion. 
This alternative argument is obviously not Dworkin's. It is 
much more directly philosophical than he would permit. In addi-
tion, for a long time Dworkin has resisted philosophical argu-
ments based on the idea of a social contract among reasonable 
citizens.19 And yet I believe that if there is to be a persuasive 
argument for a constitutional right to an abortion, it ultimately 
must lie in the idea of a fair social contract. No other idea better 
captures the visceral sense that a woman, denied this right, would 
be morally justified in obtaining an illegal abortion since she 
never would have consented to a legal system that denied her 
her own body. It can do that only in deference to the rights of other constitu-
tional persons, or for some other "compelling" reason. 
(p. 90) And, more generally, Dworkin claims: 
A state may not curtail liberty, in order to protect an intrinsic value [as opposed 
to some person's interests), (1) when the decisions it forbids are matters of per-
sonal commitment on essentially religious issues, (2) when the community is di-
vided about what the best understanding of the value in question requires, and 
(3) when the decision has a very great and disparate impact on the person whose 
decision is displaced. 
(pp. 101-02) (emphasis added) Evidently, Dworkin thinks that while the abortion deci-
sion has "a very great and disparate impact" on the women who make this decision, the 
decision to engage in animal slaughter lacks a comparably significant impact on the reli-
gious adherents who make this decision. 
18. Women who know they are morally opposed to early abortions might sign away 
the right to obtain an abortion, but only because they have already determined for them-
selves that they would not exercise this right. No woman uncertain about whether she 
would seek an abortion in a particular circumstance would give up the right to make this 
decision for herself. Choice under conditions of uncertainty is an integral part of reasona-
bleness, as Rawls has explained. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism 48-54 (Columbia U. 
Press, 1993) (distinguishing between "rational" and "reasonable"). 
19. See Ronald Dworkin, The Original Position, in Norma Daniels, ed., Reading 
Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls' A Theory of Justice 16 (Basic Books, Inc., 1975). 
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final authority over what happens inside of her. In any event, 
Dworkin's attempt to locate this right in the Religion Clauses, 
without need for direct appeal to social contract theory, is ulti-
mately unconvincing. 
III. OMITIED ISSUES 
Dworkin's focus on abortion and related issues of personal 
autonomy, like the right to die, leads him to neglect some impor-
tant questions that any general theory of constitutional interpre-
tation must confront. Three questions are particularly pressing 
for anyone who, like Dworkin, attempts ultimately to derive the 
authority for his theory from the text of the Constitution itself. 
First, what justifies the constitutional doctrine of one-person-
one-vote, given the text of the Fourteenth Amendment? Second, 
what justifies Blaisdel1,2o given the language of the Contracts 
Clause? Third, how should a contemporary court understand the 
language of the Second Amendment? 
First. Earl Warren considered Reynolds v. Sims21 his most 
important opinion, even more so than Brown.22 This belief 
makes sense, for giving people political power gives them the 
means to legislate whatever other social reforms they wish. By 
mandating one-person-one-vote as a constitutional standard, 
Reynolds gave voters in more densely populated districts political 
power that they previously had lacked. Their increased political 
power enabled them to enact civil rights and other progressive 
legislation that malapportioned legislatures had blocked for 
years. Thus, Reynolds v. Sims stands as a great victory for the 
cause of social justice as well as democratic governance. But was 
it justifiable as an interpretation of the Constitution? 
In Reynolds itself, we recall, Justice Harlan wrote a stinging 
dissent, relying primarily on the text of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's second section. That section provides that if states deny 
equal voting rights to some of their citizens the consequence is 
that their share of representatives in the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives shall be reduced proportionately. As Justice Harlan 
observed, this provision makes it difficult to interpret section one 
of the Fourteenth Amendment as insisting upon equal voting 
rights for all the adult citizens of a state23. 
20. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
21. 377 u.s. 533 (1964). 
22. See Archibald Cox, The Court and the Constitution 290 (Houghton Mifflin Co., 
1987). 
23. 377 u.s. 533, 589-625 (1964). 
166 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 14:151 
The Court's response in Reynolds was essentially to say that 
the principle of one-person-one-vote was too important to the 
existence of a legitimate political regime to let this textual diffi-
culty stand in the way. Section two of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not completely rule out the possibility that section one 
might be construed to require one-person-one-vote. It just 
makes this construction extremely implausible. But as long as 
there is even the tiniest of cracks with which to pry open the text 
and shove in the principle, then the Court should do so, given the 
overwhelming importance of the principle. 
This argument makes sense to me, but it is obvious that, ac-
cording to this argument, the principle of one-person-one-vote 
does not emanate from the text itself, but instead is imposed 
upon a reluctant text because of independent considerations of 
pure political philosophy. This approach to constitutional inter-
pretation would permit the text to block a principle of political 
philosophy as important as one-person-one-vote only if the text 
unequivocally leaves a court with not even the slightest of cracks 
into which it can wedge the principle. But the language of sec-
tion two was not absolutely airtight in this respect, and thus this 
theory of interpretation would permit the Court to resort to its 
own understanding of pure political philosophy. 
While Reynolds is defensible on these grounds, the question 
remains whether Dworkin's theory of interpretation can provide 
a different defense. Dworkin's theory, unlike this other ap-
proach, does not permit the forthright manipulation of text to 
serve independent ends determined by pure political philosophy. 
Instead, as we have seen, Dworkin's theory requires that the 
judge's reliance on philosophy be commanded by the text itself. 
Freedom's Law does not specifically discuss the issue of one-
person-one-vote, and this omission is one of the book's weak-
nesses. But Dworkin does discuss the death penalty as a ques-
tion of constitutional law, (pp. 300-01) and this discussion 
suggests how Dworkin would attempt to apply his theory to the 
issue of one-person-one-vote. In discussing the death penalty, 
Dworkin responds to the argument that the death penalty cannot 
be considered "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment when the Fifth Amendment expressly refers 
to "capital" crimes, "jeopardy of life or limb," or the deprivation 
of "life" by "due process of law." Dworkin's response to this 
argument is that, even though the authors did not consider capi-
tal punishment "cruel," if it turns out that the authors were 
wrong in this belief, then the Eighth Amendment bars capital 
1997] DWORKIN'S CONSTITUTION 167 
punishment because it bars all "cruel" punishments, including 
those that the framers failed to recognize as cruel. This interpre-
tation of the Eighth Amendment, Dworkin says, does not negate 
the language of the Fifth because the Fifth does not insist that 
capital punishment is not cruel. Instead, the Fifth Amendment 
merely provides what procedures govern capital punishment if it 
turns out, as the framers believed, that capital punishment does 
not violate the Eighth Amendment. 
Dworkin might try an analogous argument with respect to 
one-person-one-vote and the first two sections of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. According to this argument, section two of the 
Fourteenth Amendment merely determines what happens on the 
assumption one-person-one-vote is not required by "equal pro-
tection." But if a denial of one-person-one-vote is truly a denial 
of "equal protection," then section one of the Fourteenth 
Amendment mandates one-person-one-vote notwithstanding the 
conditional assumption underlying section two. 
While this kind of argument makes sense with respect to the 
death penalty, it does not work so well in the case of one-person-
one-vote. The Eighth Amendment at least clearly dictates that 
"cruel" punishments are to be forbidden, even if it is not so clear 
what punishments are cruel. Moreover, when dealing with the 
Eighth Amendment, we at least know that we are dealing with 
the category of "punishments," into which the death penalty 
clearly falls. Thus, it is hardly farfetched that the death penalty 
might violate the Eighth Amendment. All we need to know to 
make this determination is whether this form of punishment 
should be considered cruel. For this reason, it is plausible to say 
that the contrary assumption of the Fifth Amendment should 
yield in the face of compelling reasons for thinking the death 
penalty cruel. 
With respect to one-person-one-vote, however, the Equal 
Protection Clause does not refer at all to voting, much less spec-
ify whether the idea of universal adult suffrage should entail 
equally apportioned legislative districts. Indeed, we have no 
good reason to think that "equal protection of the laws" requires 
equal voting rights, especially when (as Dworkin concedes) the 
language of the clause is susceptible to a much more natural in-
terpretation, which would limit it to a requirement of equal en-
forcement of the laws as written. Thus, the explicit language of 
section two stands as a confirmation that "equal protection of the 
laws" has nothing to do with equal voting rights. There is simply 
no textual warrant for the Court's attempting to discern how the 
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Equal Protection Clause applies to legislative apportionment in 
the same way that the Court plausibly could consider whether 
the death penalty is a "cruel" punishment. 
In sum, Dworkin cannot claim that a requirement of one-
person-one-vote is derived from text in the same way that a pro-
hibition on capital punishment might be. If Reynolds is to be 
defended, we need something besides Dworkin's text-based the-
ory of interpretation. We need, instead, something like the ap-
proach the Court itself employed in Reynolds, where text acts 
only as a potential obstacle to the independently determined dic-
tates of political philosophy. 
Second. Blaisdell is the case I most like to teach in my first-
year course in Constitutional Law because it is the case that most 
pointedly raises the problem of an undesirable constitutional 
right unequivocally protected by the text itself. It is one thing for 
a court to interpret a phrase like "freedom of speech" expan-
sively, to mean more than the framers intended to say, because 
the court thinks the more expansive reading more desirable. It is 
quite another thing, however, for a court to eviscerate the plain 
meaning of a piece of text just because the court does not like the 
consequences of what it says. Yet that is just what the Court did 
in Blaisdell. 
The Contracts Clause expressly states that no state shall 
"[impair] the Obligation of Contracts." Under the terms of a 
mortgage agreement with Home Building & Loan Association, 
Blaisdell was obligated to meet a repayment schedule or else suf-
fer foreclosure, as specified in the agreement. The State of Min-
nesota, however, modified the terms of the contract to give 
Blaisdell a longer period of time to repay the loan without suffer-
ing the consequence of foreclosure. Despite this suspension of 
Blaisdell's repayment obligations, the Supreme Court upheld the 
Minnesota law. 
Blaisdell has been defended on the grounds that the Framers 
included the Contracts Clause in the Constitution because they 
thought debt relief laws harmful to the long-term economic 
health of the nation. Modem economic science, however, has 
shown, to the contrary, that debt relief laws can be beneficial to 
the nation's economic health. Thus if the Framers had had the 
benefit of this economic knowledge, they would not have in-
cluded the Contracts Clause in the Constitution, at least in its 
undiluted form. A court today, therefore, can be faithful to the 
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Framers' general intent in adopting the Contracts Clause, while 
at the same time repudiating its literal language.24 
This defense of Blaisdell has been persuasive for many of my 
more thoughtful students, but it is not a defense on which Dwor-
kin can rely. In Freedom's Law, Dworkin is emphatic in repeat-
ing several times that courts are supposed to follow what the 
Framers said, not what they intended their words to accomplish. 
"We are governed by what our lawmakers said-by the princi-
ples they laid down-not by any information we might have 
about how they themselves would have interpreted those princi-
ples or applied them in concrete cases." (p. 10) Thus, even if the 
Framers intended to protect the obligation of contracts from leg-
islative impairment only when this protection would be beneficial 
to general economic welfare, that intent is not what they ex-
pressed in the language of the clause. Instead, they said that 
there shall be no state laws that impair contract obligations. Pe-
riod. Consequently, according to Dworkin's theory, courts must 
invalidate state debt relief laws because of the plain text of the 
Contracts Clause, regardless of the economic consequences of 
doing so. Perhaps many readers will applaud Dworkin's theory 
for this reason, but I consider it a flaw of his theory that it cannot 
provide a justification for repudiating the literal text of the Con-
tracts Clause, as the Court did in Blaisdel/.zs 
Third. Is "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms" 
any less worthy of an expansive interpretation than "the freedom 
of speech"? If not, why not? We know that the Second Amend-
ment is susceptible of a narrowing construction, just like the Free 
Speech Clause. But we also know that it is capable of a robust, 
libertarian interpretation, just like the Free Speech Clause. In-
deed, in Dworkin's terminology, the Second Amendment articu-
lates an abstract moral right requiring philosophical elucidation 
in the same way that the First Amendment does. Indeed, some 
philosophers argue that the right of ordinary citizens to keep 
24. See Charles Miller, The Supreme Court and the Uses of History, excerpted in 
Brest and Levinson, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Cases and Materials 351 
(Little, Brown and Co., 3d ed. 1992). 
25. Dworkin's literalist approach to constitutional law in Freedom's Law seems in-
consistent with the theory of statutory interpretation developed in Law's Empire. In that 
earlier book Dworkin defended the sensible idea that judges may reject a literal reading 
of a statute when necessary to avoid unfair results that the legislature presumably did not 
intend. (To illustrate this point Dworkin relied on the famous case of Riggs v. Palmer, 22 
N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889), where the court held that murder defeats the right to inherit under 
the decedent's will, even though the statute of wills contained no such exception.) Sur-
prisingly, no comparable argument concerning constitutional interpretation is evident in 
Freedom's Law. 
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their own guns in their homes is as essential to the preservation 
of a democratic republic and the prevention of dictatorship as the 
freedom to speak freely about political issues without fear of 
criminal prosecution.26 
In light of all this, what justifies giving the Second Amend-
ment a narrow construction at the same time one gives an expan-
sive interpretation to the First? Here, again, text cannot help, 
since both amendments are equally susceptible to either narrow 
or broad constructions. Reliance on precedent also cannot solve 
the problem since the narrow interpretation of the Second 
Amendment is not so settled by a series of Supreme Court deci-
sions that it could not be revisited.27 
One suspects that the only possible defense for this double 
standard lies in the judgment, derived from political philosophy, 
that freedom of expression is a good right whereas the right to 
keep and bear arms is not. But this use of political philosophy 
goes well beyond what Dworkin attempts to justify. As we have 
seen, Dworkin attempts to paint a picture in which the Constitu-
tion's abstract clauses refer to fundamental values which judges 
must elucidate and elaborate upon, using insights from philoso-
phy. He never suggests that judges should second-guess the basic 
philosophical choices made by the authors of the Constitution. 
Yet such judicial second-guessing is precisely what is necessary 
with respect to the Second Amendment.28 
Thus, I propose, as an alternative to Dworkin's approach, 
that judges should first figure out what the Constitution ideally 
ought to say based on independent considerations of political 
philosophy and then, if possible, make the actual words of the 
Constitution fit these independent considerations. This alterna-
tive approach cannot pretend, as Dworkin's tries to do, that the 
26. See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics 247 (Yale U. Press, 1989): 
In the United States, ... [in its early development] existing military organization 
and technology favored the foot soldier armed with the musket and later the 
rifle. These weapons were so easily accessible and widely owned that Americans 
were virtually a nation in arms. In a quite concrete sense, the consent of the 
governed was absolutely essential if there were to be any government at all, for 
no government could have been imposed on the people of the United States 
over the opposition of a majority. 
See generally Sanford Levinson, The Emba"assing Second Amendment, 99 Yale L.J. 637 
(1989). 
27. The only Supreme Court opinion of any significance is United States v. Miller, 
307 U.S. 174 (1939), which upheld an federal prohibition on the movement of sawed-off 
shotguns in interstate commerce. 
28. Richard Epstein similarly observes that Dworkin never explains why the Takings 
Clauses should be treated differently than the Free Speech Clause. See Richard A. Ep-
stein, The First Freedoms, N.Y. Times Book Review 12 (May 26, 1996). 
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judge's philosophizing is mandated or even authorized by the 
Constitution itself. But at least this alternative approach justifies 
a narrowing construction of the Second Amendment. It also jus-
tifies, whereas Dworkin's cannot, Reynolds and Blaisdell, two of 
the Court's most important decisions of this century.zg 
IV. THE CONSTITUTION AND POVERTY 
To show that constitutional interpretation has constraints, 
Dworkin argues that it would be wrong for a judge to hold that 
the Constitution protects the poor from poverty even if pure phi-
losophy insists upon such protection. It is a shame that Dworkin 
takes this view, since no constitution worth defending would per-
mit citizens to starve to death, especially if those citizens are will-
ing to work but unable to find jobs. Because nothing in the U.S. 
Constitution unequivocally precludes a right to a "living wage,"3o 
the Supreme Court should recognize the existence of this right if 
ever Congress were to become so inhuman as to let unemployed 
citizens starve.31 The Court should recognize this right, in other 
words, for the simple reason that basic fairness insists upon it and 
nothing in the text stands in the way as an obstacle to its 
recognition. 
29. In all candor, I should note that I would go so far as to say that, in extreme 
situations, judges should protect fundamental human rights even if the Constitution ex-
plicitly forbade them from doing so. I have in mind the example of a Nazi-like constitu-
tional amendment that unambiguously prohibited judges from interfering with the 
government's program to send certain groups of people to concentration camps. In this 
situation I believe judges have a moral obligation, stemming solely from the fact they are 
human beings, to use the powers of their office to thwart the Nazi evil. This obligation 
alone would justify a judicial decree ordering the release of people from concentration 
camps on the ground that the Constitution, to have any legitimacy, must protect the basic 
security of all persons. While this judicial disobedience of an explicit constitutional com-
mand would signal the breakdown of the existing constitutional regime, I believe that this 
breakdown is imperative since otherwise the Constitution would not deserve the alle-
giance of those it purports to govern. In future writings I shall elaborate and defend this 
argument. 
30. As I use the term, "living wage" means only enough money to buy enough food 
to avoid death by starvation as well as to provide enough shelter and clothing to protect 
oneself from inclement weather. In other words, it is the absolute minimum for survival 
and falls short of what most Americans would consider the minimum necessary for a 
"decent" standard of living. 
31. The recent welfare reform legislation enacted by Congress does not necessarily 
violate this right. Although the new law ends the federal entitlement to Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC), it still guarantees up to six months of food stamps for 
citizens laid off from their jobs. See 54 Cong. Q. 2191 (Aug. 3, 19%). In addition, Con-
gress this year increased the minimum wage to make up for losses caused by inflation and 
in recent years has approved several extensions to the unemployment insurance program. 
Thus, Congress has by no means repudiated a policy of making sure that everyone has a 
decent minimum wage or some other temporary means of support in case one loses one's 
job. 
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In rejecting this sensible conclusion, Dworkin fails to distin-
guish between a constitutional right to a living wage and a consti-
tutional right to equal wealth. Dworkin says: "Even a judge who 
believes that abstract justice requires economic equality cannot 
interpret the equal protection clause as making equality of 
wealth, or collective ownership of productive resources, a consti-
tutional requirement, because that interpretation simply does not 
fit American history or practice, or the rest of the Constitution." 
(p. 11) Of course, a judge should not interpret the Constitution 
as requiring equal wealth, but the reason is not that this interpre-
tation would be incongruous with text and tradition. The reason, 
rather, is simply that this interpretation would be bad 
philosophy.3z 
There is a world of difference between a right to a living 
wage and a right to equal wealth. The latter cannot possibly be 
considered a requirement of basic fairness. Even if the lives of 
all citizens are equal in their intrinsic value, it does not follow 
that all citizens should have equal wealth or income, since per-
mitting economic inequalities might actually improve the lives of 
those with the least (as Rawls and others have observed).33 
But the idea of a living wage is not similarly flawed. No rea-
sonable person living in a generally affluent country like the 
United States would consent to a system of government that did 
not guarantee the availability of a job paying enough income to 
feed oneself. Self-preservation insists as much.34 Thus, a fair so-
cial contract necessarily would include the right to a living wage, 
and since the Constitution should conform to the essential terms 
of a fair social contract, it should be interpreted to guarantee this 
right. 
In sum, yet another reason to reject Dworkin's approach to 
constitutional interpretation is that it fails to recognize a right to 
a living wage. By contrast, the alternative approach I have sug-
32. Moreover, the idea that judges should rely on political philosophy, rather than 
text, in the exercise of constitutional adjudication does not mean that judges are free to 
impose on society their own conception of right and wrong. Sound political philosophy 
contains within itself principles of institutional responsibilities, including principles that 
require judges to leave cenain matters to the legislative branches of government. This is 
a point that Larry Sager stressed in the paper he delivered for the discussion on "Consti· 
tutional Tragedy" at the AALS annual meeting in January 1997. 
33. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard U. Press, 1971). Moreover, citi-
zens uncertain of their economic fate might be willing to risk some degree of minimum 
economic security (as long as the level does not fall too low) in exchange for some chance 
of being fabulously wealthy. See James S. Fishkin, The Dialogue of Justice: Toward a Self-
Reflective Society (Yale U. Press, 1992); Jeremy Waldron, Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 
1981-1991 at 250-70 (1993). 
34. See Waldron, Liberal Rights (cited in note 35). 
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gested would recognize this right. Indeed, the very same ap-
proach that justifies Reynolds, Blaisdell, and a narrow Second 
Amendment also justifies the recognition of this right. This ap-
proach gives judges more freedom to philosophize than Dwor-
kin's does, but as long as judges exercise this trust with a 
modicum of wisdom, the result will be a Constitution of which we 
can be proud rather than ashamed. 
CONCLUSION 
The observations of this essay must be understood in con-
text. Dworkin is the leading thinker of our time in the related 
fields of jurisprudence and constitutional theory, and any criti-
cism of his work is necessarily tempered by an awe and admira-
tion of his many pathbreaking contributions. Moreover, the 
criticisms offered here are made by one who is largely sympa-
thetic with Dworkin's efforts to infuse the enterprise of constitu-
tional interpretation with explicit reliance of political philosophy. 
My overall evaluation of Dworkin is not that he goes too far in 
this regard, but rather that he does not go far enough. 
Indeed, readers of this essay may be surprised to find me 
criticizing Dworkin for being too much like a positivist and de-
pending too much on the Constitution's text. Dworkin is usually 
considered the archenemy of positivists and often attacked for 
not placing enough emphasis to the actual language of the en-
acted law.3s In particular, Dworkin is often viewed as the exact 
opposite of Bork, with Bork being seen as the supreme positivist, 
who limits himself only to those values identified in the text of 
the Constitution.36 
But what is most interesting in reading Freedom's Law is 
how little actually separates Dworkin from Bork, especially with 
regard to their overarching general approach to constitutional in-
terpretation. They may differ passionately on how they apply 
this general approach to particular problems. But, despite these 
differences in detail, they share essentially the same general in-
terpretive approach, which is that the task of the judge is simply 
to determine what philosophical values or principles are ex-
35. Posner, for example, has said of Dworkin that "[h]is extensive writings evince 
little interest in the words of the Constitution." Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 174 
(Harvard U. Press, 1995). 
36. Posner characterizes Bork as Dworkin's "b~te noire," id. at 173, an assertion 
that is clearly justified given the vehemence of Dworkin's opposition to Bork's nomina-
tion for the Court. This vehemence is reflected in several of the essays in Freedom's Law, 
although, in an introductory preface to these essays, (p. 263) Dworkin confesses that "in 
retrospect, I am surprised at the depth of the indignation I expressed over Bork's views." 
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pressed by the language of the Constitution. In fact, in his own 
review of Bork's book, which is reprinted as one of the essays in 
Freedom's Law, Dworkin himself acknowledges that Bork's basic 
approach is little different than his own. (p. 299) 
The convergence of Dworkin and Bork, however, is not 
cause for celebration. On the contrary, we still need a theory 
that unabashedly makes more direct use of political philosophy 
than either Dworkin or Bork would permit. Judges should not 
be afraid to say that the text of the actual Constitution we have 
should be interpreted so that it conforms, as far as possible, to 
the provisions of an ideal Constitution that would be agreed 
upon by reasonable and fairrninded citizens. I have suggested 
such an approach as an alternative to Dworkin's theory, but a 
thorough defense of this alternative must await another occasion. 
